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"My joy was boundless. I had learnt the true practice of law. I had learnt to find
out the better side of human nature and to enter men's hearts. I realized the true
function of a lawyer was to unite parties riven asunder. The lesson was so
indelibly burnt into me that a large part of my time during the twenty years of
my practice as a lawyer was occupied in bringing about private compromises of
hundreds of cases. I lost nothing thereby-not even money, certainly not my
soul."
- Mohandas Gandhi (1957).'
In the thirteen years since its inception, the practice of collaborative law
(CL) has made significant strides toward dispute resolution's mainstream. It is,
according to its founder, "an idea whose time has come."2 An increasing num-
ber of practitioners and disputants seem to agree. CL is practiced in at least
twenty-six states3 and six Canadian provinces.4 An estimated 3,000 lawyers
1. MOHANDAs K. GANDHI, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY: THE STORY OF MY EXPERIMENTS WITH
TRUTH 134 (1957). Most collaborative lawyers will recognize this quote; it seems to capture much
of what has brought a growing number of practitioners to the collaborative process.
2. Stuart Webb, An Idea Whose Time Has Come: Collaborative Law: An Alternative for
Attorneys Suffering 'Family Law Burnout', MATRIMONIAL STRATEGIST, July 2000.
. 3. One of which has passed a law codifying the process. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §6.603
(Vernon 2003).
4. For information on collaborative law practice groups, see the International Academy of
Collaborative Professional's website at http://www.collabgroup.com.
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have been trained in the process,5 and it has been featured in the popular press6
and television.7
It is not at all remarkable that lawyers and their clients would opt for a co-
operative, interest-based approach to resolving their legal disputes. 8 Indeed,
interest-based negotiation has been a widely accepted means of resolving dis-
putes for over twenty-five years.9 And, like other forms of Alternative Dispute
Resolution, CL promises more creative, custom-fit resolutions in less time and
with less cost than litigation.' Unlike other alternative processes, however,
collaborative lawyering has raised specific concerns that the role of the collabo-
rative lawyer, as described by CL's proponents, is incompatible with that of a
zealous advocate.
To date, the relatively young body of scholarship on the process has con-
sisted largely of explanatory articles intended to inform the practice and advo-
cate its merits to the uninitiated. The movement has been driven by practitio-
ners, not scholars" and, accordingly, most writing on CL is found in bar journals
and the popular press. 2 Now, however, with over a decade of experiences upon
5. Diya Gullapalli, A Growing Number of Unhappy Couples Try 'Collaborative Divorce',
WALL ST. J., July 17, 2002, at DI.
6. See Id.; Chris Bergeron, Courting Divorce Without Courts; Couples work together to part
legally, THE BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 5, 2003, at 41; Anita Kumar, Lawyers Promote Simpler Di-
vorces, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 25, 2001, at 1B; Ross Werland, A Kinder, Gentler Divorce;
Lawyers and their Clients Agree There Must be a Better Way, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Sept. 26, 1999, at
1, Family Section; Louisa Kamps, For Better, Not Worse: In Collaborative Divorce, Couples Vow to
Avoid Strife, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, Mar. 8, 2003, available at http://www.jsonline.com/.
7. CBS Evening News, Collaborative Law, Which is Providing a Civil Way to Settle a Di-
vorce (CBS Television Broadcast, Jan. 23, 2001).
8. For present purposes, interest-based negotiation refers quite generally to negotiating that
focuses on meeting the interests of those involved, as opposed to a more adversarial approach which
focuses on the use of and response to extreme bargaining positions. Such interest-based approaches
also have been described as "principled," "problem-solving," "integrative," "cooperative" and "mu-
tual gains." See generally, Roger Fisher, William Ury & Bruce Patton, GETTING TO YES:
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN, (Penguin Books 2ed. 1991).
9. A 1976 study found that a majority of lawyers thought cooperative negotiators were more
effective. See Gerald R. Williams, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 15-46 (1983). See also
Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Shattering Negotiation Myths: Empirical Evidence on the Effectiveness
of Negotiation Style, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 143, 167 (2002) (a recent review and updated version
of the Williams study; finding that 54% of lawyers saw problem-solving negotiators as more effec-
tive).
10. Specific claims regarding time and cost savings are detailed in Part I.B. 1.
11. Douglas C. Reynolds, Esq., co-founder of the Collaborative Law Council of Massachu-
setts, Presentation at the Harvard Law School (Feb. 26, 2002).
12. An observation borne out in the footnotes of this article.
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which to draw, practitioners and scholars alike are in a position to look empiri-
cally at the practice of CL. Questions abound, from the mundane-Who is opt-
ing for this process? What lawyers are offering it?-to the more controver-
sial-Is CL being practiced in a way that violates the ethical rules governing
lawyers?-to the simply unknown-Does actual collaborative practice adhere
to the theory and norms upon which it is based? Because the practice is rela-
tively new, little is known about it other than what its proponents and practitio-
ners tell us.
A critical analysis of CL is only now beginning, and should be based on ac-
tual, not hypothetical information about the practice and its impact on clients as
courts, the bar, and the public begin to digest the idea of CL. This Article in-
tends to present a more comprehensive picture of collaborative practice than is
currently available, to better inform the ongoing conversation about what role
CL will play in the legal system. Toward that end, the following sketches some
basic questions about CL, and provides some preliminary answers. Part I re-
counts the origin of CL and introduces the process, including a discussion of
how the limitations imposed on both lawyers and clients by the collaborative
law agreement are designed to affect the quality of negotiations. Part II consid-
ers the ethical concerns raised by CL, particularly by the demands made by the
collaborative law agreement. The results of a survey of collaborative lawyers
and their clients are discussed in Part III, including findings relevant to the
claims of both CL's fans and critics, and additional questions raised with indica-
tions for further research. Part IV relates the experience of CL with a real cou-
ple and their lawyers in the context of divorce. Part V concludes with the rea-
sons that persist for both lawyers' and clients' resistance to CL.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO COLLABORATIVE LAW
CL originated among family lawyers, particularly in the context of divorce.
While there is interest in and efforts toward applying the collaborative model to
other types of disputes, 3 the vast majority of collaborative cases continue to be
divorce. Accordingly, the following introduction to CL assumes its application
to settlement negotiations in divorce.
A. A Brief History
The story of CL's beginnings has been told elsewhere, 4 and will be re-
counted only briefly here. Stuart Webb was (and still is) a family lawyer in
13. Douglas C. Reynolds & Doris F. Tennant, Collaborative Law-An Emerging Practice,
BOSTON BAR JOURNAL 12, 29 (2001).
14. Webb, supra note 2; Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Law: Where Did it Come From?
Where is it Now? Where is it Going?, 1 THE COLLABORATIVE QUARTERLY (Journal of the Ameri-
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Minneapolis who, in 1988, found himself in a state of "family law burnout" after
many years of practice.'5 Besieged by the constant negativity of his practice,
Webb was ready to quit the law. It was while considering an alternative career
in psychology that the idea of a new way to practice law occurred to him. By
1990, Webb had stopped going to court, resolved to represent his clients only in
negotiations in which the clients themselves participated, aimed exclusively at
settlement. In those cases where the process broke down, he would withdraw
and require the client to seek new counsel to litigate. 6 The process now known
as collaborative law was born.
It is safe to say that the CL approach caught on. In the first two years of his
collaborative practice Webb convinced other lawyers to try out his new ap-
proach, and of the 99 cases he handled in this time, all but four reportedly set-
tled. 7 Shortly thereafter Webb and a few like-minded colleagues founded the
Collaborative Law Institute, a non-profit organization whose purpose it is "to
create and practice collaborative non-adversarial strategies to help clients in
family law matters achieve agreement in a dignified and respectful manner."'"
By 1993 CL had reached California, 9 and CL practice groups have since sprung
up in at least twenty-four other states and Canada, and very recently the idea
was introduced in the United Kingdom.'°
B. The Promise of Collaborative Law
1. A Faster, Cheaper Process
As with other ADR processes, the seemingly unanimous position on CL
among commenting practitioners is that divorces negotiated under a CL agree-
can Institute of Collaborative Professionals) 1 (1999) (renamed THE COLLABORATIVE REVIEW in
2001), available at http://www.collabgroup.com.
15. Id.; Colby Cosh, Divorce Without Poison: A Family-Law Innovation Empties Medicine
Hat Courtrooms and Gains Attention Around the Continent, ALBERTA REPORT, Mar. 2002, at 30.
16. Tesler, supra note 14.
17. Id.
18. The Collaborative Law Institute's website is at http://www.collaborativelaw.org. See
also, Stephan Van Drake, Separating Together; In Collaborative Law, Lawyers Walk Away if They
Can't Broker Peace, PALM BEACH DAILY BUSINESS REVIEW, at B I, May 5, 2000.
19. Tesler, supra note 14.
20. Reports posted to a listserv discussion for collaborative practitioners indicate that a pres-
entation of CL was made in the U.K. this past January, and the first training is scheduled for Sep-
tember, 2003.
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ment cost less in time and money than conventional, adversarial representation."
What is not clear, however, is just how much faster and cheaper a given couple
can expect to reach a settlement agreement by opting for CL. The estimates
vary. One prominent practitioner offers the following rule of thumb: collabora-
tive representation "will cost from one tenth to one twentieth as much as being
represented conventionally,"22 and observes that "[i]t is not uncommon for a
single temporary support motion to cost as much or more in lawyer's fees and
costs as it costs for an entire collaborative law representation."23 One Salt Lake
City collaborative lawyer is less optimistic, but still suggests that CL "is two to
three times cheaper and three to four times faster than an in-court divorce. "24
Practitioners experiencing both with collaborative and traditional cases are in a
position to compare the length and costs of the two processes, though it is less
clear how generalizable their observations may be in other jurisdictions, geo-
graphic and social settings.
One obvious wrinkle in the faster-cheaper story is the possibility that the
collaborative process will break down, leaving the clients to find and retain new
counsel.25  They remain responsible for paying the collaborative lawyers for
time spent on the case, and are faced with the prospect of advancing another
retainer. 26 The extent to which the possibility of break-down realistically adds to
a given client's expected cost, however, is affected by the actual likelihood of
break-down. This probability and its consequences are discussed in Part III
below.
2. Better Quality Settlements
The idea that CL results in better settlements that are custom-tailored to
meet the interests of the clients compared to those handed down by a judge par-
allel similar arguments put forth for mediation. Proponents claim even more for
21. A. Rodney Nurse & Peggy Thompson, Collaborative Divorce: A New, Interdisciplinary
Approach, AM. J. OF FAM. L, Vol. 13, 226-234 (1999) ("Even at their most expensive, collaborative
divorce costs are significantly less than those in even a simple adversarial case..."); Webb, supra
note 2; Pauline H. Tesler, COLLABORATIVE LAW: ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION IN DIVORCE
WITH LITIGATION 233-34 (American Bar Association, Section of Family Law 2001) (conventional
cases "generally involve higher legal fees, and take longer to complete, than collaborative cases");
Gregg Herman, Collaborative Divorce: A Short Overview, Divorce Litigation, 2001 ("collaborative
divorces, on the average, were resolved in less time than conventional divorce actions.")
22. Tesler, supra note 21, at 233.
23. Id. at 234.
24. Elizabeth Neff, Couples Make the Best of Divorce; Collaborative proceedings focus on
keeping marital breakups civil; Divorce Can Be an Amicable Split, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, February
9, 2002, at Cl (quoting a 30-year Utah divorce lawyer now practicing collaborative family law).
25. The rule of CL triggering the lawyers' disqualification, and ethical concerns about this
possibility are discussed infra, in Parts I.C. and Il.D, respectively.
26. Pamela Yip, Divorcing Couples Can Work Together To Avoid A Nasty Fight, THE
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 8, 2002, at Business and Financial News section.
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CL, however, in that the presence of lawyers during the negotiations enhance
creativity and make for better agreements than are possible in mediation. 27 This
is one of several ways in which CL claims to be a superior process.
3. Less Stress and Emotional Impact on Clients and Children
Mental health professionals familiar with CL describe the adversarial alter-
native as reinforcing antagonism between spouses, neglecting children, and
providing no opportunity for spouses to learn effective co-parenting. 8 If this
portrayal of litigation and the negotiations that occur in its shadow is accurate,
then CL certainly falls under favorable light. By agreeing to focus solely on
settlement, the parties' interests need not be polarized or exaggerated as posi-
tions in the adversarial process. In CL, children are insulated from their parents'
dispute, 9 "families are not destroyed in the process, ' 3 and it helps divorcing
spouses work toward "the best co-parenting relationship possible."'" More gen-
erally, the four-way negotiating sessions are characterized by the clients' direct
participation, supported, where necessary, by legal counsel, which is intended to
promote greater autonomy.32
4. Less Stress on Lawyers
One promise of CL is made not to clients, their families or society at large,
but specifically to its practitioners. The stresses and adversarial maneuvers as-
sociated with traditional representation impact not only the parties, but can also
oe "nearly catastrophic for the mental and physical health of lawyers" 31 when
they must routinely behave in ways that do not comport with their personal
sense of morality. Faced with "burnout," Webb's response was to represent his
clients in a way that "eliminated what I found most disturbing in my practice,
and retain or reform those parts that gave me pleasure and satisfaction-i.e.,
27. Tesler, supra note 21, at 10 ("Four minds engage together in 'real-time' creative problem
solving.") According to Tesler, the four-way meeting format, combined with the disqualification
provision, trigger a special "hypercreativity.", at 23 1.
28. Nurse & Thompson, supra note 21, at 226-27.
29. See Appendix B, Part VII. Children's Issues, for a description of CL's commitment to
reach settlements that account for the interests of children.
30. Webb, supra note 2.
31. Tesler, supra note 21, at 227.
32. Tesler, supra note 21, at 10.
33. Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Law: What It Is and Why Lawyers Need to Know About
it, AM. J. OF FAM. L., Vol. 13, 215, at 217 (1999).
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helping clients through the divorce process in a civil manner."' "Bum-out" was
the impetus behind CL, and is what seems to have led many of Webb's col-
leagues to join him in collaborative practice.35 The promise of a better lifestyle
may, however, elicit a less enthusiastic reaction from some lawyers who worry
whether this trade-off comes at clients' expense.36
C. The Collaborative Model
The essential characteristics of CL are found in the agreements governing
the process. While the usual retainer agreement, albeit with some unusual
terms, captures the ways in which the collaborative process differs from tradi-
tional representation, many collaborative lawyers also present a statement of the
principles governing CL, 37 the most central of which are:
" A commitment to good-faith negotiations focused on settlement,
without court intervention or even the threat of litigation, in which the
parties assume the highest fiduciary duties to one another;
" full, honest and open disclosure of all potentially relevant informa-
tion, whether the other side requests it or not; and
* if either party decides to litigate, both lawyers are automatically ter-
minated from the case, requiring the parties to seek new litigation counsel.38
The last principle, referred to herein as the "disqualification provision," is
the primary way in which collaborative lawyers limit the scope of their represen-
tation, and is widely seen as the sine qua non of the process. '9 Collaborative
lawyers also reserve the right to withdraw or terminate the process' if they be-
lieve their client is not meeting the "good faith commitments" made up front.4'
34. Webb, supra note 2.
35. For a general discussion of the negative impacts of contemporary legal practice on law-
yers, and specifically how Webb's approach has served as one remedial response, see Steven
Keeva's TRANSFORMING PRACTICES: FINDING JOY AND SATISFACTION IN THE LEGAL LIFE 157-59
(1999).
36. Mary E. O'Connell, The Bookshelf. Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Law: Achieving
Effective Resolution in Divorce Without Litigation, 40 Fain. Ct. Rev. 403, July, 2002 ("There is
nothing wrong with wanting a satisfying life, but lawyers must be very sure not to attain it at the
expense of their clients.").
37. One example, included here in Appendix B, comes from the IACP, at
http://www.collabgroup.com.
38. This is interpreted by at least one CL practice group to include other lawyers at one's firm.
See James K.L. Lawrence, Collaborative Lawyering: A New Development in Conflict Resolution,
17 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 431,433-34.
39. Webb, supra note 2; Tesler, supra note 21, at 6 (describing the disqualification provision
as the "one irreducible minimum condition" for CL); Herman, supra note 21 ("The case will be
settled. If it is not-and this is critical-both attorneys must withdraw.").
40. These options are distinct. By merely withdrawing, the lawyer leaves the collaborative
process intact and her client free to select alternative collaborative counsel. Termination, on the
8
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Practitioners can construe the disqualification provision in different ways.
Most often, among practitioners, the disqualification provision establishes "a
commitment to settlement from the very start" 42 that enables both the lawyers
and their clients to focus on a negotiated resolution without the distraction of
preparing or threatening to litigate.4 3 More theoretically, it is a process-oriented
commitment engineered to diminish the value of both parties' BATNA in an
effort to keep them at the table.' Divorcing spouses negotiate "in the shadow of
the law,"45 and while the existence of other alternative dispute resolution proc-
esses may mean that litigation is not always the next preferable choice if CL
fails, it is the default to measure alternative processes. By requiring the dis-
qualification of collaborative counsel in the event of impasse or abuse of the
process, parties must incur increased costs should they desire to take their dis-
pute to court,46 making that alternative less attractive. The extent to which this
disincentive pressures parties to remain at the table has been a source of con-
cern. Because the potential for coercion is a serious critique, this issue was a
point of inquiry in the survey, the results of which are reported in Part III.
CL also requires that the parties jointly retain neutral experts to assist in the
divorce (an accountant or home appraiser, for example).47 The impact of this
other hand, refers to calling off the process itself, which triggers the automatic disqualification of
both lawyers.
41. Examples of client behavior that constitute an abuse of the collaborative process, therefore
justifying withdrawal and/or termination, include the "secret disposition of community, quasi-
community or separate property, failing to disclose the existence or the true nature of assets and/or
obligations, failure to participate in the spirit of the collaborative process, abusing the minor children
of the parties, or planning to flee the jurisdiction of the court with the children." Tesler, supra note
21, at 145.
42. Id. at xx (Introduction).
43. Kurt Chandler, Lawyer Divorces Discord; Attorney Helps Marriages End without Anger,
Star Tribune (St. Paul), Dec. 6, 1993, at lB (interviewing Stuart Webb).
44. Perhaps the most ubiquitous concept in contemporary negotiation literature, the concept of
a BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement) is explained in Fisher & Ury, supra note 8,
at 99-106.
45. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950, 968 (1979) (describing how out-of-court negotiations are affected
by the "rules and procedures used in court for adjudicating disputes"). Id at 951.
46. While collaborative lawyers do commit to facilitating the transition to new counsel, there
remains financial costs in hourly fees paid to the collaborative lawyer for services rendered, as well
as a possible retainer for new counsel. Changing lawyers also almost certainly adds time to the
divorce process. For a statement of the commitment to cooperate in transferring a file to new coun-
sel, See Tesler, supra note 21, at 138 (displaying sample retainer agreement).
47. Relative to the three principles described above, the requirement that experts be jointly
retained appears to be a softer norm. See Tesler, supra note 21, at 8, 144 (Stating, "If experts are
needed, we will retain them jointly unless all parties and their attorneys agree otherwise in writing").
9
Schwab: Collaborative Lawyering: A Closer Look at an Emerging Practice
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2004
practice is twofold. First, retaining a single, "neutral" expert to advise both
parties eliminates from negotiations the adversarial dynamic of dueling experts
with conflicting opinions on the fair market value of the home, or the optimal
custody arrangement for the children.48 Second, retaining one expert costs less
than two; to the extent experts are required in a given case, this is one of the
ways in which CL can claim to be a cheaper process.49 Collaborative lawyers
also include experts under the disqualification provision, putting them and their
work product off-limits for purposes of litigation, thereby further increasing the
stakes of failure to reach a settlement.5"
Within these contractual boundaries, the "four-way" becomes the primary
mode of negotiation in which both lawyers and spouses sit down together to
negotiate, with the latter actively participating.5 Pauline Tesler, an early con-
vert to collaborative practice who has since trained hundreds of lawyers in the
model and authored the first book-length treatment of the process,52 describes
the four-way meetings as a six-way communication in which each spouse inter-
acts directly with one another, their respective lawyers, and their spouse's law-
yer.53 The counseling that parties receive during these sessions, proponents say,
represents an improvement over mediation in that clients receive the benefits of
legal advice and advocacy in the moment, while the agreement is being
formed. 4 Contrast this with divorce mediation sessions in which lawyers typi-
cally do not directly participate. 5 In CL, its proponents see a process offering
the settlement orientation of mediation combined with built-in legal advisors and
negotiators.5 6 Even vis-A-vis mediation in which the parties' lawyers directly
participate, Tesler maintains that CL is preferable in that collaborative lawyers
are focused solely on settlement, where adversarial counsel are not. 7 For her,
and many of her collaborative colleagues, there is no doubt that CL is the "next
generation" in dispute resolution. 8
48. Id. at 47, Tesler describes this "iatrogenic" source of adversarial conflict and how it can be
avoided by including substantive experts in a team approach to "cross-disciplinary collaboration."
49. Amy K. Brown, Collaborative Law Takes a Foothold in Florida, Florida Bar News, Jan.
1, 2002 (reporting that neutral experts are one reason that CL cases cost clients 30 to 50 percent less
than litigation).
50. Tesler, supra note 21, at 145.
51. Id. at 10 (describing the four-way meetings as "the heart of the collaborative process").
52. See Tesler, supra note 21.
53. Id. at 11,78.
54. Id. at 7-11 (stating that CL combines "the positive problem-solving focus of mediation
with the built-in lawyer advocacy and counsel of traditional settlement-oriented representation");
Lawrence, supra note 38.
55. Tesler, supra note 21, at 3, n. 8.
56. Id. at 9.
57. Id. at 4.
58. Id. at 3; Survey results, reported infra, also indicate an optimistic view of CL's potential
among its practitioners.
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D. Collaborative Law and the Reputation Market
"Reputation, reputation, reputation! 0! I have lost my reputation. I have lost the immortal
part of myself, and what remains is bestial."
59
Understanding the principles and rules of CL is necessary to understand
how this process functions, but it is not the whole story. The one key piece
missing from the preceding description of CL is what all collaborative lawyers
and, for that matter, most negotiators know all too well-that reputation is king.
Both scholars and practitioners understand that one's reputation as a negotiator
is a crucial determinant of how others will negotiate with one. Applying this
truism to the collaborative context, reputation clearly takes on even greater im-
portance. Collaborative negotiating involves a certain element of risk, namely
that the other side will take advantage of your good faith approach to sharing
important information.6° Given this risk, a lawyer's reputation becomes a major
component of successful negotiating: No one wants to collaborate with some-
one who has a reputation for taking advantage.
At a time when CL was still very much in its infancy, Professors Ronald
Gilson and Robert Mnookin suggested, contrary to popular perceptions, that
lawyers could actually help their clients cooperate with one another in cases
where they could not do so on their own.6 These authors point out that, while
litigating clients may never face each other again, their lawyers often will.62 As
it turns out, this simple distinction opens a world of possibilities. In a disputing
environment characterized by revolving clients and a relatively fixed, stable
body of agents representing them, the lawyers repeatedly face one another and
develop a marketplace for reputation.63 In such a system, reputation precedes its
carrier, and agents find that their existing reputations affect the degree to which
other agents (and their clients) will be open to cooperative approaches to negoti-
ating the dispute. The professors' ideas about cooperative negotiating and the
collaborative lawyering movement began separately, but proceeded on parallel
59. William Shakespeare, Othello, act 2, sc. 3.
60. Tesler, supra note 21, at 226-27.
61. Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and
Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 509, 512 (1994).
62. Id. at 512-13.
63. Id. at 513.
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tracks, with collaborative lawyers building their new practice in the very same
conceptual space theorized by the academics.'
Gilson and Mnookin suggest that a well-working reputation market, one in
which agents can learn about each others' reputations for cooperation with rela-
tive ease, effectively lowers the risk of cooperative negotiation and will, there-
fore, increase the instance of cooperation. They posited that professional or-
ganizations might fulfill this function, promulgating standards for cooperative
conduct and certifying compliance among their membership.65 Early collabora-
tive lawyers had reached a similar conclusion in 1990 when Webb organized his
practice group dedicated to developing and spreading the new model. 66 Practice
groups continue to be the organizational unit of CL for a variety of reasons,67 but
primarily because these groups make it easier to find colleagues who can be
trusted to negotiate collaboratively. 68 Through the organization of practice
groups, collaborative lawyers have taken steps to enhance the flow of informa-
tion in their respective marketplaces.
II. ETHICAL CONCERNS RAISED BY COLLABORATIVE LAW
The practice of CL potentially raises questions regarding at least five com-
monly recognized ethical duties or rules, namely: the duty of zealous advocacy,
limitations of the scope of representation, confidentiality, conflicts of interest
and attorney withdrawal.69
64. Gilson and Mnookin were unaware of the formalized practice of CL when their article was
published in 1994, and used the term "cooperative" to characterize the same quality of negotiations
described by collaborative lawyers.
65. Gilson and Mnookin, supra note 61, at 561. This article's description of hypothetical,
cooperatively-oriented professional organizations bears an uncanny resemblance to current CL
practice groups. Instead of scholarship informing practice, or vice versa, the academics' and practi-
tioners' responses to the challenges of fostering cooperative/collaborative behavior among parties
appear to have developed separately until the mid-1990's, when the two currents became aware of
each other.
66. Supra note 18.
67. Tesler, supra note 21, at 27, writes that organizing a practice group is the first step in
introducing CL to a community, and she dedicates a chapter to group development and governance.
In addition to finding "like-minded" colleagues, CL groups are used for marketing the model and
continuing training for their members (see Chapter 9). (Apparently, there were problems locating the
correct page number and source for this citation. Author needs to provide correct page numbers for
this citation as source is unavailable.
68. In an interview with the author on March 27, 2003, Boston-based collaborative lawyer
Rita Pollak described the trust that develops between collaborative lawyers over successive represen-
tations which, to her, makes the negotiating process more efficient. As indicated in the survey, an
overwhelming majority of practitioners reported handling their most recent case with a member of
their CL group. Need correct footnote citation here so it can be referred to as "supra" in footnote 78.
69. Ethical analyses of CL, to the extent they exist, tend to focus on some or all of these
issues. For a comprehensive treatment, see John Lande, Possibilities for Collaborative Law: Ethics
and Practice of Lawyer Disqualification in a New Model of Lawyering (forthcoming). For discus-
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A. Zealous Advocacy & Limiting the Scope of Representation
The lawyer's duty of zealous advocacy is perhaps the ethical imperative
most obviously implicated by CL's commitment to full disclosure and coopera-
tion,7" and typically is the first point raised by lawyers and law school students
when exposed to CL for the first time. Critical responses suggesting that CL is
somehow incompatible with the duty focus on the very heart of the model, the
commitment not to litigate. In the eyes of some family practitioners, this part of
the agreement eliminates a valuable and legitimate tool.7 Collaborative law-
yers, however, are undaunted in their insistence that there is no inherent conflict
between zealous advocacy and a commitment to cooperation.72
The more permissive interpretation of the duty finds support in the Model
Rules. A comment to Rule 1. 373 states that while a lawyer must act "with zeal in
advocacy upon the client's behalf," she "is not bound... to press for every advan-
tage that might be realized for a client."74 Read alongside Rule 1.2, which gov-
ems the scope of representation and the allocation of authority between client
and lawyer, and which states that lawyers shall "abide by a client's decisions
concerning the objectives of representation and... shall consult with the client as
to the means by which they are to be pursued,"75 the Rules at least suggest that it
sions of CL and the duty of zealous advocacy, withdrawal and confidentiality, see Lawrence, supra
note 38, at 442-44. In her chapter on ethics, Tesler, supra note 21, considers zealous advocacy,
limited scope of representation and confidentiality.
70. Model Rules of Professional Responsibility, Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities
(2002). Paragraph 2 suggests a distinction in the quality of zeal required of litigating lawyers and
negotiating lawyers, stating that "[a]s advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under
the rules of the adversary system. As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client
but consistent with requirements of honest dealings with others." Paragraph 9 identifies as a basic
principle "the lawyer's obligation zealously to protect and pursue a client's legitimate interests,
within the bounds of the law, while maintaining a professional, courteous and civil attitude toward
all persons involved in the legal system."
71. One Houston-based matrimonial lawyer decries the prospect of losing "a very good piece
of my arsenal." See Jennifer Mathieu, Divorce Over Easy; Collaborative Divorce Promises to be
Kinder, Faster, Cheaper. But Does it Really Work?, Houston Press, August 29, 2002 available at
http://www.houstonpress.com/issues/2002-08-29/feature.html.
72. Tesler, supra note 21, at 160-61; Lawrence, supra note 38, at 443. Pollak interview,
supra note 68 ("I can be a fierce advocate without being a jerk.").
73. Stating that "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing
a client."
74. MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 1.3, cmt. 1.
75. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 1.2(a). Zealous advocacy aside, Rule 1.2(c)
would seem to permit the properly counseled client and lawyer to agree to work under the rules of
CL ("A lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the
circumstances and the client gives informed consent.").
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is permissible for lawyers to fulfill their professional duty of zealous representa-
tion while limiting the scope of the representation to the terms of the CL agree-
ment. Of course, any limitation must be reasonable, and requires the client's
informed consent.76
B. Conflict of Interests
CL practice groups consist of lawyers organized to engage in common ac-
tivities and, as such, may be seen to resemble law firms in certain respects, rais-
ing a question of whether the representations by members of these groups impli-
cate the Model Rule against conflicts of interest." Analyzing the rules, and the
one ethics committee opinion that has addressed the matter, Professor John
Lande concludes that CL practice groups probably would not be considered
firms under the Model Rules if members "do not hold themselves out as a firm
or share access to client information."78
Model Rule 1.7 is concerned with the possibility of conflicting interests be-
tween clients represented by related counsel. As suggested in Part I.D., how-
ever, CL may present more of a potential challenge for managing conflict be-
tween the interests of collaborative lawyers and their clients. As described by
Gilson and Mnookin, a would-be cooperative lawyer must develop and maintain
a reputation for being cooperative. 79 Seen through this lens, training and mem-
bership in CL practice groups have in part developed as a means to make infor-
mation about reputation more available and reliable. As lawyers invest in de-
veloping their reputations for collaboration, there necessarily arises the potential
for conflict between the lawyer's interest in her personal reputation, and the
client's interest in pursuing his objectives via non-collaborative means.8" Gilson
and Mnookin suggest the possibility of a client who hires a cooperative lawyer
to gain the advantage of her good reputation, who then tries to co-opt her into
taking advantage of the other side when their guard is lowered. Relative to other
practitioners, however, domestic relations lawyers are probably more resistant to
client pressure to defect since their clients tend to be one-time customers and
lawyers are not overly dependent on any one of them.81 While this is good news
for those concerned with maintaining the integrity of the CL model, critics may
still question whether collaborative lawyers are too insulated from their clients'
wishes.
76. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 1.2(c).
77. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 1.7(a).
78. Lande, supra note 69.
79. Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 61.
80. Id. at 551.
81. Id. at 546.
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C. Confidentiality
Does the full and open disclosure of information in CL threaten a lawyer's
ability to maintain client confidentiality? At first pass, the answer would appear
to be no. Model Rule 1.6 states "[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating
to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent." Read
this imperative alongside the collaborative lawyer's obligation in regards to the
disclosure of relevant, material information, namely that she is "bound by the
voluntary ethical undertakings of the collaborative process to refuse to go for-
ward unless the information is disclosed."82 Imagining a scenario in which a
client reveals a relevant and prejudicial piece of information to his collaborative
lawyer, we can see at once that, per Rule 1.6, she cannot reveal it to the other
side without her client's permission, nor can she continue to negotiate on her
client's behalf under the rules of CL. Courses of action open to this lawyer un-
der Rule 1.6 are to withdraw (or perhaps even terminate), per CL dictate, or to
obtain the client's informed consent to make the disclosure. The duty to main-
tain confidentiality would seem to permit either.
Of more concern is a practice among some collaborative practitioners of re-
fusing to have substantive discussions with their clients outside of the four-way
meetings, 83 conduct which makes it more difficult for lawyers and clients to
maintain attorney-client privilege."M However, as described in Part III.B., most
collaborative lawyers reject this extreme interpretation of CL's emphasis on
four-way negotiations.
D. Attorney Withdrawal
Rule 1.16 governs the circumstances under which a lawyer may withdraw
from representation and permits this only when it "can be accomplished without
material adverse effect on the interests of the client." 5 When withdrawing from
representation, the collaborative model requires its practitioners to "facilitate the
transfer to successor counsel."86 This applies whether the lawyer withdraws and
terminates the collaborative process, or merely withdraws personally but leaves
the process intact. In the former case, transition would likely be to litigation
82. Tesler, supra note 21, at 167, discussing confidentiality and privilege.
83. Lande, supra note 69, at note 11 (citing a study in progress by Prof. Julie McFarlane that
found this practice among some Canadian collaborative lawyers).
84. Id. at note 85.
85. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 1.16(b).
86. Reynolds & Tenant, supra note 13, at 1-2.
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counsel, whereas in the latter it may be to another collaborative lawyer. Accord-
ing to Tesler, exchanging the necessary information and helping a client to find
another lawyer is part of the collaborative practitioner's responsibility, and also
fulfills her professional responsibilities.87
Some critique has focused on the possibility that the disqualification provi-
sion could be used in bad faith by a client to force the withdrawal of the other
party's lawyer.88 Such a client could feign an interest in cooperation, entice the
other side into signing on to a CL agreement, then act in bad faith to require the
process' termination and the withdrawal of both lawyers. Of course, the offend-
ing client would also bear the burden of losing counsel. While this creates the
possibility for abuse, any analysis of CL should take into account the frequency
with which this might occur. Survey data reported in Part III suggest that with-
drawal is rare under any circumstances.
E. CL's Ethical Orientation and Relationship with the Model Rules
Tesler advises her collaborative colleagues that they are under the same
ethical rules as other lawyers, but that they interpret them differently when
working under a CL agreement.89 Rationalized under the Model Rules, the
thrust appears to be that the CL agreement is a permissible limitation on the
scope of representation, and that the client can provide effective, informed con-
sent up front to participate in the process. Meanwhile, James Lawrence, a mem-
ber of the Ohio practice group included in the survey, suggests that in CL "an
individual client is no longer the lawyer's sole concern in the traditional sense.
The duties of competence and diligence for the collaborative lawyer are ex-
panded to encompass the interests of the neutral."'  This orientation invites
practitioners "to straddle the line between advocacy and neutrality," placing
them in "a unique ethical position."9' It does seem from their descriptions that
these formulations represent distinct conceptions of the ethical orientation to be
adopted by collaborative lawyers, and suggests they shift to some degree from
advocacy toward neutrality, which represents a greater departure from conven-
tional ideas of the lawyer's role. Depending upon how this idea plays out in
practice, it may be too great a departure for the current Rules to bear.
The question of whether CL is permissible under the Model Rules may
hinge on which of these orientations CL practitioners claim. Because it seems a
less drastic departure from conventional practice, Tesler's formulation is more
87. Tesler, supra note 21, at 166.
88. Lawrence, supra note 38, at 444-45; Lande, supra, note 38.
89. Tesler, supra note 21, at 169.
90. Lawrence, supra note 38, at 442.
91. Id. at 438-39.
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likely to gain widespread acceptance. Those practitioners who want to establish
a "quasi-neutral" status may find it easier to seek a change in the Model Rules.92
III. AN EMPIRICAL LOOK AT COLLABORATIVE DISSOLUTION"
The survey described herein was originally inspired by a collaborative law-
yer's lament that there has been little empirical research to inform or evaluate
the practice of CL.94 In response to this perceived need, a survey was designed
to gather information both about the process and its principle participants, the
clients and their lawyers; the goal being to create an empirical "snap-shot" of
this emerging practice.
A. Methodology
Survey packets were sent to 367 collaborative family lawyers belonging to
practice groups across the nation in early March 2003. Each packet was deliv-
ered by mail and included: 1) a cover letter to the lawyer, 2) a survey for the
lawyer, 3) a cover letter for the lawyer's most recent client, 4) a survey for that
client, and 5) return envelopes for both surveys. 95 The lawyers' cover letter
introduced the surveys, noted that the International Academy of Collaborative
Professionals (IACP)96 lent its support to the research, and gave instructions. In
order to reach clients who had opted to try CL in their divorce, lawyers were
92. For a relevant proposal to change ethical rules to enhance lawyers' abilities to represent
clients in mediation-perhaps the closest analogue to collaborative lawyering-see Kimberly
Kovach, New Wine Requires New Wineskins: Transforming Lawyer Ethics for Effective Representa-
tion in a Non-Adversarial Approach to Problem Solving: Mediation, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 935
(2001).
93. The phrase "Collaborative Divorce" is used by practitioners to describe a particular model
of collaborative practice in which lawyers join with other experts in a cross-disciplinary team ap-
proach to representing the divorcing spouses. A collaborative divorce team, in addition to the law-
yers, typically consists of two mental health professionals who serve as coaches for the respective
spouses, a neutral "child specialist" to consult the couple on custody and co-parenting issues, and a
neutral financial specialist. For descriptions of this approach and the distinctive roles of the profes-
sionals involved, see Stuart Webb, Collaborative Divorce: A New Model that Takes a Team Ap-
proach to Marital Dissolution, MATRIMONIAL STRATEGIST, January 2002; Nurse and Thompson,
supra note 21; Tesler, supra note 21, at 86.
94. Reynolds, supra note 11.
95. Copies of both cover letters and survey instruments are included in Appendix A.
96. Formerly the American Institute of Collaborative Professionals, the IACP is an interna-
tional umbrella organization for practice groups in the U.S. and Canada and producer of The Col-
laborative Quarterly, the one journal devoted to CL.
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asked to send to their most recent clients a client letter and survey, regardless of
whether they reached settlement via that process. 97 The clients' cover letter was
brief, and told clients that their experience would be valuable to both lawyers
and clients participating in CL. Both letters gave assurances of confidentiality.
1. Practice Groups
Because CL is relatively young, it was determined that older, more estab-
lished collaborative law groups represented the most promising sites from which
to gather data on the process. In addition to history, geographic location was
taken into account to draw data from a variety of regions across the country.
The survey identified eight practice groups in seven states, one each in Califor-
nia, Florida, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Ohio, Wisconsin, and two in Texas.
98
Some groups consisted exclusively of family lawyers, while others were organ-
ized into different substantive sections of which family practice was only one.
In the latter groups, the survey included only those lawyers identified as family
practitioners. Another distinction among the groups was the scope of their or-
ganization. Some were statewide practice groups, while others were limited to
certain counties or metropolitan areas.
2. Survey Instruments
Both survey instruments were developed in consultation with law school
faculty, collaborative lawyers, and a statistician. To protect the anonymity of all
participants, survey forms were not coded to specific individuals, but were in-
stead identifiable by practice group.
99
97. The choice of client was to be determined by the lawyers' survey, a part of which asked
them to answer questions about their most recently concluded collaborative representation. The
lawyers were asked to send the client materials to the client they represented in that case. By direct-
ing the lawyers' choice of client-subject in this way, it was hoped that sample of clients would not be
biased by any desire on the lawyers' part to include only those cases they had settled.
98. The groups chosen were thought to have more members who had handled more cases.
Factors in this assessment included the groups' histories and perceived strength of their interest in
CL. Groups were selected based on the author's own research and consultation with established
collaborative practitioners. In an interesting aside, as this research effort was announced in a col-
laborative law e-mail discussion group and the surveys began to circulate, a number of collaborative
lawyers and mental health professionals from practice groups in the U.S. and Canada contacted me
and requested that their groups be included. In order to avoid a self-selection bias, however, no
additional groups or individuals were included in the study.
99. It was thought that tracking surveys individually might make lawyers' more self-
conscious and result in skewed responses, and perhaps reduce the likelihood of their forwarding the
clients' survey.
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a. The Lawyer's Survey
The lawyer's survey consisted of thirty-five items divided among four sec-
tions. The first section of the survey collected demographic information about
the lawyer, including age, sex, characteristics of their practice, and education.
In the second section, the lawyers were asked about their experience with and
perspectives on CL, including specific questions about the number of collabora-
tive cases they have handled, settled, and withdrawn from. They were next
asked about their specific training in the collaborative model. Lawyers were
also asked for their opinions on matters such as the applicability of CL to di-
vorce, the number of hours they expect to spend on collaborative representa-
tions, and their responses to ideas that have proven provocative in the debate
surrounding the propriety of collaborative law. The third section of the survey
asked about these practitioners' training and experience in other alternative
processes, such as mediation, arbitration, counseling, and psychotherapy. Fi-
nally, the fourth section of the survey focused on the lawyers' most recently
concluded collaborative case. In addition to whether that case was settled via
the collaborative process, lawyers were asked about hours billed, experts re-
tained, and the number and nature of meetings. They were also polled on their
sense of the significance of the disqualification provision.
b. The Clients' Survey
The clients' survey was briefer, consisting of nineteen items divided into
two sections. The first section was demographic, including questions on age,
sex, race, education, income, and characteristics of the family and marriage.
The second section asked clients about their personal experience with CL, in-
cluding how they learned of the process and the factors they considered most
important in choosing it. Clients were also asked about the financial costs of
their collaborative representation. Finally, they were asked whether the dis-
qualification provision affected their approach to the negotiation, and about their
level of satisfaction with the process.
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B. Results
1. Demographics
a. Response Rates and Composition of the Samples
Of the 367 surveys sent to lawyers, nine were returned as undeliverable and
seventy-one were at least partially completed, for a response rate of 19.8%.
Participation varied by group, ranging from 12.5% in Florida to 29.8% in Min-
nesota. As demonstrated in Figure 1, the varied response rates resulted in a
survey sample dominated by three practice groups, two that are located in
neighboring mid-western states.
Figure 1. Lawyer Sample by Practice Group (n = 71)
Twenty-five clients returned at least partially completed surveys. While a
significantly lower response rate for clients was expected,1" a true rate was dif-
100. A number of factors led to this lowered expectation. The busy pace of a typical law
practice diminishes the chances of any response to a survey, and it is probable that if a lawyer is
likely not to complete her own survey, as indicated above, the chances of her taking the effort re-
quired to send one on to her client are even less. It is conceivable that some lawyers saw the request
to forward correspondence on to clients as annoying or intrusive. Also, while the lawyer's cover
FL MA
4% 8%
W1
CA_
6%
"lX~b)j
6% Tx(a)
7%
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ficult to derive. In seven instances lawyers indicated that they had not yet re-
ceived a collaborative case. Another lawyer returned a blank client survey
without explanation along with his or her own survey, largely incomplete.
Based strictly upon those known instances in which the lawyer could not or did
not forward a client survey, the response rate is 7.1%. It seems quite likely,
however, that the actual response rate is higher. Just as a portion of survey
packets were returned as undeliverable, it seems likely that a portion of clients
would be equally inaccessible to their former attorneys, particularly following
divorce where at least one, and sometimes both, spouses relocate. Also, it is
conceivable that some lawyers purposely or inadvertently did not forward sur-
veys to their clients. While the practice groups are more equally represented
among clients than lawyers, Ohio, Minnesota and Wisconsin still predominate
regionally. Implications of the composition of both samples are discussed below.
Figure 2. Client Sample by Practice Group (n = 25)
letter appealed to their self-interest in benefiting from the compilation of novel data, most clients
having no similar interest are less likely to take the effort to respond.
FL MA
4% 12%
CA .... OH8% 24%
TX(b)
8%
Tx(a) " MN
12% 16%
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b. The Collaborative Lawyer
Collaborative family lawyers are experienced and are, on average, sixty
years old (range = 31 to 65 years) with twenty years of legal practice (range =
4.5 to 41 years). Considering that dissatisfaction with years of traditional, ad-
versarial practice is what led many lawyers to try the collaborative model, this
comes as little surprise. Related to this "burn out" theory, it may be that more
seasoned lawyers are better positioned to see the benefits of CL for clients in
light of their experience with the outcomes of many traditional cases. But there
exists at least one additional factor behind the predominance of older lawyers:
CL has yet to find its way into law school curricula, limiting its exposure to
young lawyers. °0
Collaborative family lawyers were more likely to be female, as women
comprised 60% of the sample (n = 70). Almost 17% reported having graduate
degrees outside of law. They spent most of their professional time dealing with
divorce, with over half reporting that this accounted for 90% or more of their
practice. Collaborative cases, however, comprise a relatively minor part of these
lawyers' practices. They reported, on average, that 23% of their divorce cases
were collaborative representations, though the modal response was a mere 1%.
Only 17.4% of the sample said that half or more of their cases were collabora-
tive, while three lawyers described their practices as 100% collaborative. These
findings support the anecdotal, but common observation of practitioners that
there currently are more lawyers eager to collaborate than there are clients will-
ing to try the process.
Training in CL is the basic requirement for entry into a practice group,"° '
and while all lawyers reported having received some instruction, the hours of
training ranged from five (one instance) to sixty (two instances). The average
hours trained was 24.7 hours (mode = 40), and 90% of those responding had at
least eight hours. Forty-six lawyers (69.7%) had received their initial training in
2000 or later.
The vast majority of collaborative lawyers practice in small settings. Forty-
two percent were solo practitioners, while another 38% practice in firms of ten
or fewer colleagues.
101. CL proponents have called for greater emphasis on problem-solving skills generally, and
the inclusion of CL in particular in law school curricula but, for the most part, this has not material-
ized. See Lawrence, supra note 38, at 445; Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Law: A New Paradigm
for Divorce Lawyers, 5 PSYCH. PUB. POL. & L. 967, 987 (1999); But see Lande, supra note 69,
(reporting at least four recent exceptions).
102. The author is not aware of any CL practice groups that admit members who have not
completed at least a cursory one-day training.
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Figure 3. Size of Firm
If this is representative of collaborative lawyers as a whole, this finding has
implications for that part of the disqualification provision thought by most prac-
titioners to preclude representation of a client by another lawyer at one's firm
following termination of the collaborative case. It is wholly irrelevant for the
large portion of solo practitioners, and less likely to be triggered by lawyers
practicing in small firms.
c. The Collaborative Client
Collaborative clients were white, middle-aged, well educated and affluent.
The average age was forty-nine years, and ranged from thirty-four to sixty-nine.
Eighty-four percent had completed a four-year college degree, and 32% held
either a masters or doctoral level degree. Eighty-four percent reported an an-
nual, pre-divorce combined household income greater than $100,000, while ten
of the twenty-five clients surveyed reported household incomes greater than
$200,000. One hundred percent of clients identified themselves as Caucasian. 3
103. The specific item gave clients five racial and ethnic categories (Caucasian; African-
American; Hispanic; Native American; Eskimo or Aleut; Asian or Pacific Islander) and asked them
to "select all that apply." Each respondent exclusively selected Caucasian. These categories were
adopted from those used by the U.S. Census.
11 to 50
13%
51 to 100
4%
More than 100
3%
2 to 10
38%
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Twelve men and thirteen women responded to the survey (48% and 52%, re-
spectively).
The marriages dissolved via the collaborative process tended to be long
term, averaging 22.2 years. 72% percent of clients reported having at least one
child under the age of eighteen at the time of their divorce, 36% had two minor
children, and 12% had three. These marriages could be described as traditional
in the sense that reported pre-divorce, individual incomes indicated that the hus-
band was the primary, if not sole earner."°'
2. Collaborative Lawyers' Collective Experience
Lawyers collectively reported their involvement in 748 collaborative repre-
sentations, 0 5 or an average of 11.3 cases per lawyer,"° conducted over the past
eleven years."°7 While the bulk of this experience was somewhat concentrated
among a few lawyers, this latter group was comprised of members of all practice
groups except those in Florida and Massachusetts. The twelve most experienced
practitioners"0 8 handled 389 cases, or 52% of all those reported, while twenty-
four lawyers (33.8% of the sample) had handled three or fewer cases. Figure 4
represents the composition of this collective experience by practice group.
Figure 4. Collaborative Cases Reported by Practice Group
FL
1% MdA
Wl 3%
15%
18%
TXb: MN
6% TXa 25%
7%
104. Four women and no men reported individual incomes in the zero to $19,999 bracket,
while eight men and no women reported incomes above $180,000.
105. Lawyers were asked to report all cases in which they had negotiated under a collaborative
law agreement, whether or not they settled.
106. For this item, n = 66, reflecting the five lawyers who had not yet handled a collaborative
case.
107. It is likely that the bulk of cases reported are relatively recent, however, since over half of
those lawyers surveyed received their initial training in CL within the past four years.
108. Operationalized by number of collaborative cases handled.
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3. Settlement Rates
Of the 748 cases handled by the sample, 654 were settled"° for an overall
settlement rate of 87.4%. This compares favorably with previously reported
divorce mediation settlement rates,110 but falls short of some CL proponents'
reports."' But a higher rate appears in the most recently completed cases. Of
the sixty-three lawyers reporting on their last case," 2 fifty-eight said they
reached settlement, a rate of 92.1%. It was thought that increased experience
with collaborative law would make practitioners more proficient with the model,
with a corresponding increase in their settlement rate. To test this hypothesis,
individual settlement rates were calculated for the group of twelve experienced
lawyers mentioned above. The individual experience levels in this more sea-
soned group ranged from sixteen to ninety collaborative cases, with an average
of 32.4 cases per lawyer. The group's settlement rates ranged from 68.3% to
100%, and averaged 91.1%, providing no indication that the chances of settle-
ment are affected by the lawyer's experience with CL.
Settlement rates were also calculated by a practice group, with the exception
of Massachusetts and Florida groups, which reported only twenty-four and
eleven cases, respectively. Rates did vary somewhat by practice group. Cali-
fornia and Wisconsin fell on the lower end with 78.7% and 79.6%, respectively,
while Minnesota and Texas 1 3 reported rates of 94% and 94.1%, respectively.
Ohio fell in the middle with 88.3%.
109. Lawyer Survey, Item 8, asked lawyers to report as settled those cases that they had "han-
dled through to a complete agreement, resolving all issues."
110. Joan B. Kelly, A Decade of Divorce Mediation Research: Some Questions and Answers,
34 FAM. & REcONCILIATION CTS. REv. 3, 373, 375 (1996) (summarizing a number of studies
finding settlement rates between 50% and 85%). Kelly cites a "[g]eneral consensus that settlement
rates higher than 85% suggest a more coercive process," and suggests that higher rates are indicative
of neither a better process nor outcome. For a more complete development of the latter idea, see
Frank E.A. Sander, The Obsession with Settlement Rates, I 1 NEGOTIATION J. 329 (1995).
I11. Pamela Yip, Divorcing Couples Can Work Together to Avoid a Nasty Fight, THE DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Oct. 8, 2002 (quoting a Dallas-based lawyer's claim that 95% of collaborative
cases settle); Brad Daisley, Collaborative Family Law Pioneer Finds He is Happier and Wealthier,
THE LAWS. WKLY., Jan. 14, 2000 (reporting Stu Webb's personal settlement rate as 96%).
112. Lawyer Survey, Item 22.
113. Settlement data from the two Texas-based practice groups were combined for the purposes
of this calculation. Together, cases handled by these groups accounted for 13.6% of all reported
cases.
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Figure 5. Settlement Rate by Practice Group
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Explanations for these varied rates could lie with different practices or
shared norms among practice groups. For example, if a group were to screen
cases in a way that allowed relatively higher-conflict, lower-functioning couples
into the collaborative process, we would expect a lower settlement rate. Another
possibility lies in different practices around the decision to terminate the proc-
ess. If normative differences exist among groups about how much adversarial
conduct is "too much," then those with a lower tolerance would be more likely
to terminate a given case, thereby lowering that group's settlement rate. An
observation of divorce mediation settlement rates suggests that higher rates may
be associated with greater pressure from collaborative counsel to reach agree-
ment.
114
4. Time and Cost
Among the claims made by its proponents is that CL is a faster process; the
estimates vary somewhat, ranging from one to seven months. 15 The clients
114. Kelly, supra note 110, suggesting that settlement rates in mediation above 85% are sug-
gestive of coercion.
115. Mary Ann Fergus, A Different Kind of Divorce; As Ex-Spouses Focus on Happy Children,
'Happily Ever After' is What Happens When a Marriage Ends, Hous CHRON, Feb. 10, 2002, at 1 (a
"couple months"); Deana Driver, Collaborative Family Law Making Progress in Saskatchewan, 21
THE LAWS WKLY 33, , Jan. 11, 2002 ("three to four months"); Valerie Hill, Divorce Without Malice;
Collaborative Law Teaches Respect, Talk -and Solutions, THE RECORD (Canada), May 30, 2002, at
DI ("one to six months); Mary Alice Robbins, Texas First to Adopt Statute Allowing for Collabora-
tive Family Law Process, 17 TEX. LAW. 33, Oct. 22, 2001, at 1 ("four to seven months").
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surveyed spent from 1.5 to sixteen months in the collaborative process, but on
average took 6.3 months to reach a settlement (mode = 6).
CL also claims to be an inexpensive process, and this appears to be a sig-
nificant selling point for clients, many of whom considered cost a primary factor
when choosing the process." 6 Again, claims of cost savings vary, but a number
of practitioners put the price tag at one-third or less than the cost of litigating a
case."' Client reports varied widely, presenting a range of $1,200 to $20,000, or
an average of $8,777.l8 While Tesler offers no dollar estimates in her manual
for collaborative lawyers, she does include a construct for estimating the cost of
collaborative representation in lawyer-hours that accounts for the complexity
and number of issues presented and the clients' level of functioning." 9 For
high-functioning clients without complex issues, Tesler suggests that one to
three four-way meetings will be required, and that each lawyer will spend ten to
fifteen hours on the case. 20 The middle tier covers the greatest number of cases,
consisting of those adequately functioning clients with more complex issues."'
According to Tesler, clients can expect three to seven four-way meetings and
fourteen to twenty-five hours of their lawyers' time. 22 Finally, cases with more
numerous, complex issues and/or dysfunctional clients will require seven or
more four-way meetings and a minimum of twenty-five hours.'23
On average, lawyers billed their clients 28.7 hours for work on their most
recently concluded representation. Assuming an even distribution of "easy,"
"average," and "difficult" cases in the sample, this suggests that the hour esti-
mates need a slight upward adjustment. However, the number of four-way
meetings per case is well within Tesler's estimates, at an average of 4.3 per case.
116. Several factors considered by clients in choosing CL are considered below.
117. John McShane & Larry Hance, Collaborative Family Law on the Rise; Divorce Pain is
Inevitable, But Suffering Through Litigation is Not, TEXAS LAW, July 3, 2000, at 29; Amy K.
Brown, Collaborative Law Takes a Foothold in Florida, 1 FLA. B. NEWS 29, Jan. 1, 2002, at 20;
Kurt Chandler, Lawyer Divorces Discord; Attorney Helps Marriages End Without Anger, STAR
TRIBUNE (Minneapolis, MN), Dec. 6, 1993, at lB (quoting Stu Webb's one-third cost estimate).
But see Tesler, supra note 21, at 233, who suggests that the relative costs of CL are even lower, from
one tenth to one twentieth those of litigation.
118. In Item #17, clients were asked how much they spent in legal fees, including fees for
lawyers, experts, and filing fees, but not to include amounts paid in settlement.
119. Tesler, supra note 21, at 18.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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5. Clients' Decision-making Process
Clients were asked how they came to enter the collaborative process, and
about the factors that were most important to their decision. Of those clients,
44% first heard about CL from their lawyer, and 16% from their spouse. An-
other 16% learned of CL from a counselor or therapist, and the remainder heard
about it from friends, newspapers and the Internet. 124
To gain insight into what interests clients bring to the process, they were
presented with eight possible factors and asked to rank these in order of impor-
tance to their decision to try CL. 1 5 The most frequently ranked factor was "im-
pact on children," selected by 44% of clients, followed by 32% of clients choos-
ing "concern for co-parenting relationship with spouse." Read together, these
responses indicate that over three-quarters of all clients come to the process
concerned primarily about their children.
The influence of lawyers also appears to figure significantly in client deci-
sion-making. Of the clients, 20% ranked "lawyer's recommendation" as the
primary factor behind their choice, while another 24% identified it as their sec-
ond most important consideration. This observation may come as good news to
lawyers, but it also suggests an additional challenge for obtaining informed con-
sent. To the extent that clients are willing to follow a course of action primarily
because their lawyer suggests it, they may not be weighing other factors, such as
the potential risks associated with CL.
Another 20% of clients ranked "cost savings" as the most important factor,
and 80% ranked it at some level of importance. "Time savings" was ranked by
68%, but usually as a tertiary consideration.
6. Disposition of Terminated Cases
Since some of the criticism directed at CL focuses on the possibility that
parties will fail to reach settlement, lawyers were asked what happened in cases
in which they terminated or withdrew from the process. Of all of the cases re-
ported, fifty-five were terminated without a comprehensive settlement. Termi-
nation was initiated by clients in forty-two (81.8%) instances and by their law-
yers in the remaining ten (18.2%). Of all the terminations, thirty-six proceeded
124. Client Survey, Item 10.
125. Client Survey, Item 12. Clients were asked to rank only those factors that they considered
in making their decision. The suggested factors were: cost savings, time savings, lawyer's recom-
mendation, spouse's request, impact on children, concern for co-parenting relationship with spouse,
desire to negotiate directly with spouse, and other (providing space for respondents to write in and
rank additional factors).
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to litigation,16 which was the most common route for couples leaving the col-
laborative process. Four cases went to mediation, four couples reconciled, one
continued negotiations without representation, and the disposition of ten termi-
nated cases was unknown.
7. Perceived Significance of the Disqualification Provision
Clients and lawyers were asked to estimate the significance of the disquali-
fication provision, the sine qua non of CL. Lawyers who settled their most re-
cent case were asked, "How significant was the disqualification/withdrawal
provision of the collaborative law agreement in influencing your client to remain
in negotiations?"'127 Of the answers received, 35% of practitioners said it was
"very significant," 43% said it was "somewhat significant, and 22% said it was
"not at all significant." The latter figure is of most interest, given the emphasis
placed on the disqualification provision as the single most definitive characteris-
tic of the collaborative model. While it may be that 22% of collaborative law-
yers do not see this is as an essential piece of the process, the lead-in to this
survey question prompted them to respond in the context of their most recent
case. It is more likely that these lawyers did not see the disqualification provi-
sion as having a significant impact on these particular clients.
Clients split when asked whether the disqualification provision ever kept
them in negotiations when they would have otherwise gone to court.2 8 Of those
who reached settlement, 54.5% said it had not kept them at the table, while
45.5% said it had. This suggests the possibility, for a slight majority of clients,
of a cooperative, interest-based negotiating process without the threat of lawyer
withdrawal. But this does not necessarily indicate that the threat of disqualifica-
tion is irrelevant to most clients, since these reports are ex post. Clients consid-
ering CL before divorce and the lawyers screening them for appropriateness are
very much ex ante.
CL's critics have suggested that the disqualification provision may apply
inappropriate pressure on clients to settle. That over half of the participants said
126. Lawyers with clients proceeding to litigation were not asked specifically whether they
withdrew from the representation, per the CL agreement. Clients were asked whether their lawyers
withdraw after they decided to litigate, but only one client went to court (and her lawyer withdrew).
127. Lawyer Survey, Item 30.
128. Client Survey, Item 18. "As you know, the collaborative law agreement required your
lawyer to withdraw from your case if you had decided to go to court. If you did not litigate, did this
term in the agreement ever serve to keep you in negotiations when you would have otherwise gone
to court?"
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the provision did not keep them in negotiations when they otherwise would have
left suggests otherwise. Another indirect measure relevant to this point is client
satisfaction level. Clients were asked to rate their level of satisfaction with the
outcome of their divorce on a scale of one (least) to five (most). 29 Overall,
satisfaction was high, averaging 4.35. Those who said that the disqualification
provision did not influence them to keep negotiating (n = 12) reported an aver-
age satisfaction level of 4.5. Significantly, those who said it had kept them at
the table (n = 10) still reported a satisfaction level just over four. If coerciveness
is determined at least in part by clients' experiences, a high satisfaction level
among those experiencing some form of pressure in the process suggests an
absence of coercion.
8. Lawyers' Perspectives on CL
Specific concerns regarding collaborative lawyers' interpretations of their
duties of zealous advocacy and client confidentiality were recounted in Part II.
To shift this analysis from reliance on hypothetical to actual practices, practitio-
ners were asked to agree or disagree with two relevant and potentially provoca-
tive statements.
The first statement presented was: "Collaborative lawyers are more like
neutrals than like counsel for individual clients."'3 ° This sample of lawyers
widely rejected the idea. None "strongly agreed"; five (7.2%) "agreed"; six
(8.7%) were "uncertain"; thirty-six (52.2%) "disagreed"; and twenty-two
(31.9%) "strongly disagreed" (n = 69). This response, in spite of the relatively
high number of lawyers who are trained or have served as neutral mediators or
arbitrators, suggests that collaborative lawyers do see themselves as advocates
for their clients, maintaining a relatively more traditional view of their roles as
lawyers, even in the collaborative context.
The second statement presented was: "Once a collaborative law agreement
is in place, there is little need to meet privately with my client.' ' 1 This sugges-
tion found even less sympathy among respondents. None "strongly agreed";
four (5.8%) "agreed"; one (1.5%) was "uncertain"; thirty-one (44.9%) "dis-
agreed"; and thirty-three (47.8%) "strongly disagreed" (n = 69). This response
is directly relevant to the critique of this practice, apparently adopted by at least
129. Client Survey, Item 19.
130. Lawyer Survey, Item 17. This item was intended to measure current opinion among
practitioners of the notion that the collaborative lawyer is somehow less an advocate, and more like a
neutral. See Lawrence, supra note 38, at 442. Respondents were asked to indicate whether they
strongly disagreed, agreed, were uncertain, agreed, or strongly agreed.
131. Lawyer Survey, Item 18. This item was intended to measure current opinion among
practitioners of this practice, mentioned in note 83, supra. Again, lawyers were asked to respond to
a five-point scale of agreement.
380
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a few collaborative lawyers. Inasmuch as opinion translates to actual practice,
lawyers' reactions suggest that they are not engaging in this behavior, which
could potentially endanger client confidentiality and the maintenance of attor-
ney-client privilege.
C. Limitations and Recommendations for Further Research
Practice groups were not represented evenly in the sample of lawyers; this
due in part because of the varied response rates described above, and also be-
cause practice groups varied in size (surveys were sent to all qualified lawyers in
each group). The result, demonstrated in Figure 2, is that a disproportionate
number of lawyers from Wisconsin, Minnesota and Ohio were included in the
calculation of those statistics reflecting individual lawyers or lawyers' opinions.
To the extent that regional differences affected responses, these results may
reflect a mid-western influence. Also, the client sample was relatively small,
and the groups were better represented therein. This lowers reliability relative to
the lawyer sample, though the client sample's composition better represents the
population.
Future empirical research on CL should focus on distinguishing the impact
of the model's various components. The disqualification provision is the most
controversial element of the process, and perhaps the one characteristic most
likely to discourage clients from choosing CL. Because this survey has indi-
cated that a majority of clients do not feel as though the provision did what it
was intended to do (i.e., keep them at the table), it seems important to discern
whether it actually is the sine qua non of the model.132
Also, CL's claim to be a general improvement over mediation bears further
scrutiny. It may be that CL is a better process, though perhaps only for a subset
of divorcing couples. Finally, the survey revealed very few instances of "col-
laborative divorce," or use of the multidisciplinary team model. Because this
model is not at present commonly used in all places where CL is practiced, re-
searchers hoping to learn more about the roles these non-legal experts play
should focus on areas and/or practice groups known to use them.
Future survey efforts should identify alternative means of instrument deliv-
ery to clients in order to increase sample size and eliminate the possibility of
sampling biases introduced by lawyers selectively disseminating client surveys.
132. For an alternative view on the role of the disqualification provision, describing a related
process called "progressive divorce" in which the provision is not required from the beginning, see
Curtis Romanowski, Collaborative Law-How it Works and Why Progressive Divorce is Preferable,
20 MATRIMONIAL STRATEGIST 6 (2002).
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IV. ONE COUPLE'S COLLABORATIVE DISSOLUTION13 3
A. The Anderson's
Boston couple Tom and Ann Anderson largely resemble other couples who
are opting to collaborate in divorce. They are both white, in their mid-fifties,
and have one fourteen-year old son. Tom has a master's degree, and Ann had
completed two years of college. Their marriage of fifteen years was Ann's first
and Tom's second. The couple had worked together to operate a small business
out of the family home, yielding a combined income between $40,000 and
$50,000 per year.
The Anderson's were in marital counseling when it became clear to them
both that their marriage could not be salvaged. At the time, mediation seemed
an obvious choice for them. "We didn't want to spend a lot of money, and we
really wanted to work out a co-parenting plan," Ann explained. Dan had settled
his first divorce via mediation, so the alternative was for him a familiar one.
This time, however, the mediation became stalled. For Ann, it was their inabil-
ity to get past "a couple of tough issues," including deciding who would move
out of the family home, that led her to call off the mediation after their fourth
session.
While Tom and Ann could not agree on settlement terms, or even about
why the mediation had failed, they were both filled with dread at the prospect of
going to court. That was when the mediator told them about a new option called
collaborative law. 1
34
B. Their Lawyers
Ann did not have to go far to get more information about CL. As it turned
out, the lawyer she had consulted briefly during the mediation was Doris
Tennant, a collaborative family lawyer and member of the Massachusetts Col-
laborative Law Council (CLC), the state-wide practice group. The case would
be Tennant's first collaborative representation, and it came after a time in which
she had been "struggling" with litigation. "I didn't want to continue doing it-
the whole process was too tense, to stressful, too dishonest, too inefficient." She
had heard of lawyers who had stopped going to court, and it sounded to her like
a good idea. In April 2000 she joined with local colleagues for Boston's first
133. This Part is based on four separate interviews conducted by the author with two former
spouses and their collaborative counsel in March and April 2003. To protect their privacy, the
clients are referred to by pseudonyms.
134. Though CL was by this time a decade old, it had only reached Boston in 2000. For a brief
history of early training and the founding of the Massachusetts Collaborative Law Council, see
Reynolds & Tennant, supra note 13.
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CL training led by Pauline Tesler, and co-founded the CLC shortly thereafter.
For the past two years Tennant has not been to court, and she has no plans to
return. Ninety-five percent of her practice is domestic relations work, 40% of
which is consists of her own mediation practice. The balance is filled by negoti-
ating settlements, both inside and outside of CL.
Tennant gave Ann a folder of materials produced by the CLC describing the
process, including its basic principles as described above in Part I.C.135 Also
included were copies of press articles on the process, some written by collabora-
tive lawyers. Recalling her first conversation about CL, Ann said that Tennant
told her to expect "a more compassionate, more human process than litigation."
Ann also remembers hearing that the process was ideal for working out co-
parenting arrangements, and would cost a mere fraction of the $30,000 she could
expect to spend litigating a "normal" case. It did not take long for Ann to decide
to try CL. "It was very important to me to feel in control of the process and its
outcome. I had these horrible visions of some court-appointed guardian making
decisions about our son."
When Ann shared the materials with Tom, he was receptive to the idea.
"When the mediation failed, I thought we were headed for court. I was pleased
when Ann found an alternative." He read over the articles and contacted one of
the authors, family lawyer Rita Pollak, also among the first CL-trained Bostoni-
ans and a founding member of the CLC. "I'm over the top about Collaborative
Law," says Pollak, who three years ago swore off litigation. She pitches the
process to all her clients, though only after telling them about mediation. Like
Tennant, she is a divorce mediator with this area comprising about one-third of
her practice. Another third is dedicated to collaborative cases, and the remain-
der is guardian ad litem work. When Pollak explained the disqualification pro-
vision and its possible consequences, Tom recalls thinking, "It was fair, given
what we were hoping to accomplish-a low cost means to a rational settlement,
with the least amount of contention."
The lawyers knew each other, but had never worked together on a collabo-
rative case. "Collegiality in the divorce bar has dissipated," says Pollak. For
her, much of CL's value comes from being able to tell her clients that they can
trust the other side. "Candor among colleagues works to the benefit of clients."
The two lawyers met over lunch to discuss the agenda of the first four-way
meeting.
135. See supra Part I.C. at 5.
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C. Their Process
The Anderson's collaborative dissolution required three four-way meetings
over three months in the summer of 2001. Before each they prepared with their
respective lawyers. This preparation covered not only what the clients wanted,
but also what might happen if they were to go to court. "As much as 40% of my
analysis is driven by what a court might do with a situation," says Tennant.
"These forecasts made Ann more realistic about what she could hope to accom-
plish." When they did come together in the four-ways, Tom described the meet-
ings as "pro-forma." "Most of the work was done beforehand in separate meet-
ings." The pre-meetings he refers to are first between client and lawyer, then
between lawyers. These communications took place either in person, over the
phone, or using e-mail. The lawyers prepared with Tom and Ann, and with each
other, before each four-way. Describing the preparation process generally, Pol-
lak works with her clients to "identify explicitly the 'hotspots' that are going to
come up. We'll talk about numbers, too." For Ann, the separate contact with
her lawyer throughout the process was crucial. "Doris helped me to work
through the stress and anger. She was very patient, very attending." At the
same time, Tennant was able to guide Ann and keep her focused on the negotia-
tion.
The tough issues that had kept the Anderson's from reaching agreement in
mediation, however, persisted at the collaborative table. Among their differ-
ences, both felt strongly that the other should be the one to move from the fam-
ily home; their positions had not changed since the mediation had broken down.
Ultimately, it was their shared interest in their son that would keep them talking
to one another. "We were both very committed to his welfare," says Tom. But
a shared commitment to raising their son did not help decide who would get the
house. Indeed, it is not difficult to imagine that divorcing spouses, being equally
committed to meeting their child's best interests, could both believe sincerely
that they should remain in the home. What finally broke the impasse was the
one factor that had changed between the processes: Time.
"I finally backed down on the house and left," says Ann. "Time had passed
and emotionally I was more ready to move than I had been during the media-
tion." In retrospect, Ann also believes that she was more committed to obtain-
ing the divorce than was Tom. In the end, it was a friend's suggestion-not
counsel from her lawyer-that led Ann to consider the compromise. Conversa-
tions with all four participants clearly indicate that the substantive break-through
had not come easily, nor was it the only difficult point of contention. For exam-
ple, Ann felt strongly that her retirement account should be off limits, while
Tom wanted it considered as marital property. He described Ann's approach, at
certain times, as, "[w]hat's hers is hers, and what's mine is up for negotiation."
The most difficult process-related moment occurred not between the clients,
but between Ann and her husband's lawyer. Ann describes a four-way meeting
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in which Pollak "surprised [her] with some comments that didn't seem collabo-
rative, but instead more provocative." She left the meeting upset with both law-
yers; with Pollak for taking what Ann perceived as an aggressive stance, and
with her own lawyer for not defending her at the table. Tennant remembers the
moment well. "Ann told me that she felt as though she had just been through
the meeting from hell." Tennant had not realized the impact of the moment on
her client until afterwards, when she asked Ann's permission to address the
matter directly with her colleague. The result was a call from Pollak to Ann, in
which she apologized. Tennant suggests that Ann may have been more wary in
subsequent meetings, but not to a degree that affected the case. Ann agrees. "It
made me feel like the process is human, not seamless, but human." Looking
back, she sees the exchange as "just a blip in the process."
D. Postlude: Looking Back at the Settlement
When the Andersons took their agreement to court in November 2001, the
judge had never heard of CL. After listening to their description of the process,
he congratulated the Andersons for being "pioneers." When interviewed, one
and a half years after finalizing their divorce, the ex-couple still agrees that their
settlement is working. Asked how well the agreement met their needs, Tom
says, "I didn't want to be a weekend father, and I'm not." They share physical
and legal custody of their son, fifty-fifty, and say he has adjusted well to the new
situation. "The co-parenting is working well, and that was our primary goal,"
Ann reports. Indicating how important post-divorce concerns were to the out-
come of their case, she describes the settlement agreement as their "co-parenting
plan." But just how well it is working might be surprising to some.
After leaving the family home, Ann moved to an apartment five minutes
away. Now both parents are equidistant from school; they talk often and share
expenses related to raising their son. They continue to attend the same church
and maintain mutual friends, another interest they shared entering the process.
Ann describes meeting Tom at a church function after the divorce, where they
were able to chat amicably. Friends approached them, complimenting them on
how well they seemed to be coping with the split.
The Anderson's successful co-parenting relationship notwithstanding, both
still have different ideas about the compromises made to reach settlement. "I
gave more on the intractable points, in the best interests of our son," says Tom.
According to Ann, "I negotiated hard, and got what I felt I could...in the end I
wanted the divorce sooner, and paid for it in terms of the cash settlement." To-
day the ex-couple is dealing with harsh realities shared by most divorced cou-
ples, regardless of the process they chose. "It's tough financially. When I was
385
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married there was a cushion. Now there is none," Ann says. She now works as a
credit analyst, while Tom continues to run the business. With detectable am-
bivalence, she reports having no regrets, and at the same time is bothered by a
sense that Tom enjoys "a better lifestyle."
Both, it turns out, were quite satisfied with their collaborative experience
and would recommend the process to others. But they do say that CL would not
be appropriate in all cases. Tom sees divorce "as much a psychological process
as it is a legal process," and suggests that collaboration will not work in cases
where "people have scores to settle." Ann actually has recommended CL to
others since the divorce, including her brother. "It didn't work for them, though.
They weren't able to come together."
The Anderson's story calls to mind what has probably been the harshest cri-
tique of CL to date. Professor Penelope Bryan, who wrote her critique in re-
sponse to an introductory article by Tesler,'36 may well look at Ann as the para-
digm of what is wrong with CL. For Bryan, "reforms like collaborative divorce
that focus on emotions and relationship preservation, almost to the exclusion of
substantive concerns are likely to do little to alleviate the post-divorce suffering
of women and dependent children."' 37 Revisiting the outcome from Ann's per-
spective, Bryan might say that she traded certain tangible interests in exchange
for preserving a working relationship with Tom for co-parenting purposes, 138 the
kind of self-defeating trade that women are socially conditioned to make.'39
As serious as the indictment may be, two responses temper its impact.
First, Ann's stated trade was meeting her interest in a quick resolution in ex-
change for some portion of the cash settlement that she may have won had she
kept negotiating. Her interest in expediency may have resulted in a poorer fi-
nancial outcome, and CL may well have facilitated the trade, but there would
appear to be no obvious reason to associate the desire for a quick divorce with
sex. Second, in her reply to Bryan's critique, Tesler points out that Bryan's
concern is not that CL leads to worse outcomes for women, but that it fails to
correct long-standing problems with litigation and mediation that have had a
disparate impact on women. "° CL has never claimed to do as much.
136. Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Law: A New Paradigm for Divorce Lawyers, 5 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 967-1000 (1999).
137. Penelope E. Bryan, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Preventive Law's Transformative
Potential For Particular Areas of Legal Practice: Family Law "Collaborative Divorce": Meaning-
ful Reform or Another Quick Fix?, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y. AND L. 1001,1002-03 (Dec. 1999).
138. Id. at 1014 (stating that "[s]ome women also fail to pursue their property and support
interests in order to preserve the peace between them and their ex-husbands, perhaps for the sake of
the children. The values favored in collaborative divorce support these often short-sighted trades.").
139. Id. at 1017.
140. Pauline H. Tesler, The Believing Game, The Doubting Game, and Collaborative Law: A
Reply to Penelope Bryan, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1018 (1999).
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V. CONCLUSION
As Tom puts it, "I'm a logical person, it's an obvious process.. .why hasn't
it caught on earlier?" Undoubtedly, part of the answer lies with the principle of
inertia. For lawyers, the model requires not merely additional training, but also
what Tesler describes as a deeper retooling of oneself where old habits are de-
constructed and new ones put in their place. 4' For clients, the task may be even
more daunting. They must put aside much of what society tells them about di-
vorce, and in most cases what they have learned about communication in gen-
eral-and negotiation in particular-at an emotionally-charged time when learn-
ing new skills and perspectives is certain to be more difficult. For both groups,
it is just easier to proceed as others have before them.
But more than just forward momentum has kept most lawyers and clients
off CL's alternative path. Real points of resistance exist. For lawyers, ethical
and professional responsibilities may be seen to preclude working under a CL
agreement, though I have suggested here that this is not necessarily the case.
Even if deemed permissible, other lawyers simply see CL's restrictions as get-
ting in the way of getting the job done. Some clients may fear the additional
costs associated with the possibility of a failed process (having reasons to pre-
dict a fair chance of failure), or they may doubt their spouses' willingness to
play by the rules. But these clients, as a group, are not those for whom CL is
intended. Potential CL clients are those whose relationships with their spouses
are functional enough for them to negotiate, the type of clients who have been
opting for mediation for the past two decades. In addition to selling the model
itself, CL's proponents need to convince these clients that they really do have a
superior alternative. If the development and spread of divorce mediation is any
indication, CL may well emerge in its second decade as a viable third alternate
for divorcing couples.'42
141. Tesler, supra note 21, at 28.
142. Chip Rose, Why Collaborative Law?, Sept. 5, 2001, available at
http://mediate.comlarticles/rose.cfm, predicting that "within a decade, we will have three mainstream
dispute resolution choices: collaborative law, mediation and litigation."
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VI. APPENDICES
Appendix A: Survey Materials
1. Lawyer's Cover Letter
March 6, 2003
Dear Collaborative Lawyers:
I am writing to enlist your help in what I believe is the first nationwide sur-
vey of collaborative divorce practitioners and their clients.
This research, approved and supported by the International Academy of
Collaborative Practitioners (IACP) and supervised by Professor Robert
Mnookin, Director of the Harvard Negotiation Research Project, comes at a time
when the collaborative law scholarship consists mostly of explanatory articles
guiding the curious and advocating its merits to the uninitiated. Today, how-
ever, with pockets of collaborative lawyers in cities across the country and a
decade of experience on which to draw, we have an opportunity to look at col-
laborative law in a systematic, empirical way. By polling both lawyers and their
clients, I hope to compile an empirical "snap-shot" of the current state of col-
laborative law to provide insight into both the range of practices subsumed un-
der collaborative lawyering, and the impacts these are having on the partici-
pants.
This survey should take no more than 15 minutes of your time. It asks you
to reflect on your collaborative practice in general, and also on your most recent
case. This case need not have settled, but merely be one in which a collabora-
tive law agreement was signed by all participants. Enclosed you will find two
surveys, one for you and one for your most recent client. Please take the few
minutes needed to complete the attorney's survey, and forward your most recent
client's survey to him or her within the next seven to ten days. Please consider
affixing a personal note to the client's survey, encouraging him or her to re-
spond. All surveys may be returned to me at the Program on Negotiation in the
stamped envelopes provided.
Of course, all data submitted will be considered confidential and, if pub-
lished, will be shared only in compiled form without identifying markers. If you
have any questions or concerns, you can contact me at (617) 784-1349 or
wschwab@law.harvard.edu. Thank you in advance for your help in this impor-
tant research effort.
Sincerely,
William H. Schwab
Law and Negotiation Research Fellow
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2. Lawyer's Survey
This survey is designed to collect information about the process of collaborative
divorce and its participants. As such, some questions are demographic, some
ask about your overall experience, while others ask you to reflect on your most
recent collaborative divorce case. For the purpose of answering the latter items,
please select your most recently concluded collaborative divorce representation,
regardless of whether a settlement was reached via the collaborative process.
Collaborative Lawyer Information
1. Age: -
2. Your sex: Male Female
3. Select the most accurate description of your practice/firm size:
a. Solo Practitioner:
b. 2-10 lawyers: -
c. 11-50 lawyers: -
d. 51-100 lawyers:
e. More than 100:
4. Years of legal practice?: -
5. What percent of your overall practice is devoted to divorce law?: __ %
6. What graduate degrees outside of law, if any, do you hold?:
Collaborative Law Experience and Perspectives
7. What percent of your divorce caseload is comprised of collaborative cases?:
8. How many divorce cases have you negotiated under a collaborative law
agreement (whether or not they settled)?:___
9. How many collaborative divorce cases have you handled through to a com-
plete agreement, resolving all issues?:
10. How many of your collaborative cases have terminated without the clients
signing a comprehensive settlement agreement?:
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1Oa. Of those cases, how many terminated because one or both lawyers decided
that the case should not continue in collaboration?:
lOb. How many terminated because a client decided not to continue in collabo-
ration?:
11. How many of your terminated collaborative cases went on to:
a. litigation:
b. mediation:
c. other processes (please specify):
12. In how many of your collaborative cases have you withdrawn as collabora-
tive counsel without terminating the process?:
12a. In these cases, for what reason did you withdraw?
a. personal: -
b. conflict with client:
c. bad faith conduct by client: __
d. other (please specify):
12b. In how many of these cases did the client retain subsequent collaborative
counsel?:
13. When did you receive your first formal training in collaborative law
(Month, Year)?: _
14. How many hours of formal training in collaborative law have you re-
ceived?:
15. Please estimate the number of hours you expect to spend on:
a. An "easy" collaborative divorce case?: __
b. An "average" collaborative divorce case?: __
c. A "difficult" collaborative divorce case?:
16. In your opinion, what percent of all divorce cases in your community could
reach settlement via the collaborative process?: _ %
17. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statement:
"Collaborative lawyers are more like neutrals than like counsel for individ-
ual clients."
a. Strongly disagree:
b. Disagree:
c. Uncertain:
d. Agree:
e. Strongly agree:
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18. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statement:
"Once a collaborative law agreement is in place, there is little need to meet
privately with my client."
a. Strongly disagree:
b. Disagree:
c. Uncertain:
d. Agree:
e. Strongly agree:
ADR Experience
19. Please identify those processes for which you have received continuing
professional level education or other formal education or training, and
briefly describe your experience therein:
a. Mediation:
b. Group Facilitation:
c. Arbitration:
d. Psychotherapy or Counseling:
20. Do you belong to any Alternative Dispute Resolution organizations (aside
from your collaborative law group)? If yes, please specify:
21. Have you ever served as a third-party neutral in a legal dispute?:
21a. If so, how many times?: __
Most Recent Collaborative Divorce Case [Please answer the following ques-
tions in the context of your most recently concluded collaborative divorce repre-
sentation.]
22. Did the case reach settlement via the collaborative process?:
23. If no, please describe the matter's disposition:
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24. How many hours did you bill for your work on the case?:
25. What experts, if any, did your client retain? Please specify whether these
were retained jointly or separately.
26. How many four-way sessions were held as part of the case?: __
27. What issues, if any, were addressed by the lawyers alone, in separate meet-
ings or by other means of communication:
28. Had the other lawyer received training in collaborative law?: __
29. Was the other lawyer a member of a collaborative lawyers' group to
which you belong?:
30. Answer the following question only if your most recent case reached set-
tlement via the collaborative process: "In your estimation, how significant
was the disqualification/withdrawal provision of the collaborative law
agreement in influencing your client to remain in negotiations?"
a. Very significant:
b. Somewhat significant:
c. Not at all significant:
3. Client's Cover Letter
March 6, 2003
Dear Sir/Madam:
I am writing to you about your recent divorce, in which you chose to par-
ticipate in a relatively new form of dispute resolution known as "collaborative
law." As you may know, collaborative divorce is a fairly new phenomenon. As
such, your experience is a valuable key to help both family lawyers and divorc-
ing couples understand the nature of this process and its impact on those who
choose it.
I hope that you will take the 10 minutes needed to complete the enclosed
survey about your experience with collaborative divorce, within the next seven
days. When finished, please return your survey in the enclosed pre-addressed
envelope.
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Of course, all information submitted will be considered confidential and, if
published, would be shared only in compiled form without identifying informa-
tion. Thank you in advance for your help in this important research effort.
Sincerely,
William H. Schwab
Law and Negotiation Research Fellow
Harvard Law School
4. Client's Survey
This survey is designed to collect information about your experience with
the process of "collaborative divorce." To help us better understand your ex-
perience, we ask that you respond to the following items, regardless of whether
the collaborative process resulted in a settlement agreement in your case. Some
questions ask you about your background, while others ask you to reflect on
your particular experience with collaborative divorce. All information submit-
ted will be held in strict confidence.
Back2round Information
1. Your age at the time you began the collaborative divorce process:
2. Your spouse's age:
3. Your sex: Male Female
4. Length of the marriage at the time you began the collaborative divorce
process?:
5. Do you have children from this marriage? If so, please specify the age
of each at the time you began the collaborative process:
6. Racial or ethnic identification: Please select all that apply:
a. Caucasian:
b. African-American:
c. Hispanic:
d. Native American, Eskimo or Aleut: __
e. Asian or Pacific Islander: __
7. Education: Please select the highest level completed:
a. High school: -
b. Associate's (2 yr) degree: -
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c. Bachelor's (4 yr) degree :
d. Master's degree: -
e. Doctorate degree: -
8. What was your annual individual income (pre-divorce)?:
a. Below $19,999: __
b. $20,000 to $39,999: __
c. $40,000 to $49,999: __
d. $50,000 to $59,999: __
e. $60,000 to $69,999: __
f. $70,000 to $79,999: __
g. $80,000 to $89,999: __
h. $90,000 to $99,999: __
i. $100,000 to $109,999:__
j. $110,000 to $119,999:
k. $120,000 to $129,999:__
1. $130,000 to $139,999:__
m. $140,000 to $149,999:__
n. $150,000 to $159,999:__
o. $160,000 to $169,999:__
p. $170,000 to $179,999:__
q. $180,000 to $189,999:__
r. $190,000 to $199,999: __
s. Above $200,000: __
9. What was your annual combined household income (pre-divorce)?:
a. Below $19,999: __
b. $20,000 to $39,999: __
c. $40,000 to $49,999: __
d. $50,000 to $59,999: __
e. $60,000 to $69,999: __
f. $70,000 to $79,999: __
g. $80,000 to $89,999: __
h. $90,000 to $99,999: __
i. $100,000 to $109,999: __
j. $110,000 to $119,999:
k. $120,000 to $129,999: __
1. $130,000 to $139,999:__
m. $140,000 to $149,999: __
n. $150,000 to $159,999:__
o. $160,000 to $169,999:__
p. $170,000 to $179,999: __
q. $180,000 to $189,999:__
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r. $190,000 to $199,999: __
s. Above $200,000: -
Your Collaborative Divorce Experience
10. Where did you first hear about collaborative divorce or collaborative
law?:
a. Your lawyer:
b. Spouse:
c. Counselor or therapist:
d. A friend:
e. Other (please specify):
11. Who first suggested that you and your spouse try the collaborative
process?:
a. You:
b. Your lawyer:
c. Your spouse:
d. Counselor or therapist: -
e. Your spouse's lawyer: -
f. Other (please specify):
12. Please rank the following factors in the order of their importance to
your decision to try the collaborative process (ranking the most impor-
tant as "1"). Do not rank factors that did not affect your decision.
a. Cost savings:
b. Time savings:
c. Lawyer's recommendation:
d. Spouse's request:
e. Impact on children: __
f. Concern for co-parenting relationship with spouse:
g. Desire to negotiate directly with spouse:
h. Other(s)?:
13. How many four-way sessions (including both spouses and both law-
yers) occurred in your case?: __
14. Did the collaborative process result in a settlement agreement?:
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15. If you ultimately litigated the divorce, did your lawyer withdraw from
the case?:
16. How long did the collaborative process take, from beginning to end?:
17. How much do you estimate you spent in legal fees (including fees for
lawyers, experts, and filing fees, but not amounts paid as part of the set-
tlement)?: $ -
18. As you know, the collaborative law agreement required your lawyer to
withdraw from your case if you had decided to go to court. If you did
not litigate, did this term in the agreement ever serve to keep you in ne-
gotiations when you would have otherwise gone to court?:
19. Whether you reached agreement via collaborative negotiations or went
to court, how satisfied were you with the outcome of your divorce
process? Please rate your level of satisfaction on a scale of 1 to 5 (5
being most satisfied): __
Appendix B: Principles of CL 43
From the Int'l Academy of Collaborative Professionals at
http://www.collabgroup.con
Statement of Principles of Collaborative Law
I. THE COLLABORATIVE LAW PROCESS
Collaborative Law is a cooperative, voluntary conflict resolution vehicle for
parties going through a separation, dissolution or other family law matter.
The participants, which include both the attorneys and the parties, acknowledge
that the essence of "Collaborative Law" is the shared belief that it is in the best
interests of parties and their families in Family Law matters to commit them-
selves to avoiding adversarial proceedings - particularly litigation - and instead
to work together to create shared solutions to the issues presented by the parties.
The goal of Collaborative Law is to minimize, if not eliminate, the negative
economic, social and emotional consequences of litigation to families.
Choosing Collaborative Law requires a commitment to resolving differences
justly and equitably.
143. From the Int'l Academy of Collaborative Professionals at http://www.collabgroup.com/.
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II. NO COURT OR OTHER INTERVENTION
Collaborative Law requires a commitment to settling the issues in-
volved without court intervention. Participants must agree to give full, honest
and open disclosure of all information, whether requested or not. Participants
must agree to engage in informal discussions and conferences to settle all issues.
III. CAUTIONS
There is no guarantee that the process will be successful in resolving a
dispute. The Collaborative process cannot eliminate concerns about the dishar-
mony, distrust and irreconcilable differences which have led to the current con-
flict.
Although the participants are committed to reaching a shared solution, each
party is still expected to identify and assert his or her respective interest and the
parties' respective attorneys will help each of them do so.
IV. PARTICIPATION WITH INTEGRITY
Participants must commit to protecting the privacy, respect and dignity
of all involved, including parties, attorneys and consultants.
Each participant must commit to maintaining a high standard of integrity; spe-
cifically, participants shall not take advantage of the other participants, or of the
miscalculations or inadvertent mistakes of others, but shall identify and correct
them.
V. EXPERTS AND CONSULTANTS
Sometimes the input of outside experts such as accountants, appraisers
and therapists might be needed to assist the participants in reaching creative and
informed solutions. If any such experts are needed, they will be retained jointly.
All such experts and other consultants retained in the Collaborative process shall
be directed to work in a cooperative effort to resolve issues.
VI. CHILDREN'S ISSUES
In resolving issues about sharing the enjoyment of and responsibility
for children, the parents, attorneys and therapists shall make every effort to
reach amicable solutions that promote the children's best interests.
Parents will act quickly to resolve differences related to the children and to pro-
mote a caring, loving and involved relationship between the children and both
parents.
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Every effort will be made to insulate children from involvement in the parents'
disputes. Parents will consider attending Kids' Turn with their children or, in a
county where Kids' Turn programs are not available, a similar parent-child di-
vorce education program.
VH. NEGOTIATION IN GOOD FAITH
The process, even with full and honest disclosure, will involve vigorous
good faith negotiation. Each participant will be expected to take a reasoned
position in all disputes. Where such positions differ, each participant will use his
or her best efforts to create proposals that meet the fundamental needs of both
parties and if necessary to compromise to reach a settlement of all issues.
Although participants may discuss the likely outcome of a litigated result, none
will use threats of abandoning the collaborative process or of litigation as a way
of forcing settlement.
VIII. ATTORNEYS' ROLE - ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS
The attorneys' role is to provide an organized framework that will
make it easier for the parties to reach an agreement on each issue. The attorneys
will help the parties communicate with each other, identify issues, ask questions,
make observations, suggest options, help them express needs, goals and feelings,
check the workability of proposed solutions and prepare and file all written pa-
perwork for the court. The attorneys and the parties shall work together to reach
a solution which serves the needs of both parties.
The Collaborative process requires parity of payment to each attorney. The par-
ties will make funds available for this purpose.
Each attorney is independent from the other attorneys in the Collabora-
tive group, and has been retained by only one party in the collaborative process.
IX. ABUSE OF THE COLLABORATIVE PROCESS
A Collaborative Law attorney will withdraw from a case as soon as
possible upon learning that his or her client has withheld or misrepresented in-
formation or otherwise acted so as to undermine or take unfair advantage of the
Collaborative Law process. Examples of such violations of the process are: the
secret disposition of community, quasi-community or separate property, failing
to disclose the existence or the true nature of assets and/or obligations, failure to
participate in the spirit of the collaborative process, abusing the minor children
of the parties or planning to flee the jurisdiction of the court with the children.
X. DISQUALIFICATION BY COURT INTERVENTION
An attorneys' representation in the Collaborative process is limited to
that process. No attorney representing a party in the collaborative process can
ever represent that party in court in a proceeding against the other spouse. In the
event a court filing is unavoidable, both attorneys are disqualified from repre-
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senting either client. In the event that the Collaborative Law process terminates,
all consultants will be disqualified as witnesses and their work product will be
inadmissible as evidence.
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